

claims to show that the differences between the various ways of analysing correlations are more apparent than real (I mean the various *techniques*, not the variety of alternative answers within each technique) is of greater interest to the technician than to the non-mathematical reader, and does not affect the main issue : what is a factor ?

The concluding pages are of interest to everyone. Is there any evidence as to the distribution of temperamental traits throughout the population ? Are introversion and extraversion opposite ends of a continuous distribution such that a "mixed or relatively well-balanced mind" is "the commonest of all" ? Evidence is produced in favour of this suggestion, and Burt urges that further investigation be done on this subject.

It is impossible to pass a single judgment on the book. It is obscure and difficult, the footnotes and varieties in type are well-nigh intolerable, and the student may be bewildered by the numerous definitions of 'factor' that appear from page to page, but there is no doubt about its being an important contribution to the subject. Whenever one reads anything written by Professor Burt, one feels oneself to be in contact with a lively philosophical mind. He is, if one may so express oneself, fundamentally 'un-slick'.

W. J. H. SPROTT.

Mind and Deity, being the Second Series of a Course of Gifford Lectures on Metaphysics and Theism, given in the University of Glasgow in 1940. By JOHN LAIRD. London : Allen & Unwin, 1941. Pp. 322. 10s. 6d.

IN the Second Series of his Gifford Lectures Professor Laird undertakes two main tasks, which he considers to be interconnected. The first is to examine the common-sense realism or dualism which was provisionally assumed in the First Series, and to see whether it ought to be replaced by some form of mentalism. The second is to supplement the First Series by considering those mental and moral properties which theists have generally ascribed to God.

Professor Laird considers that the two forms in which the Ontological Argument has been presented, first by philosophers before Hegel, and then by Hegel and his followers, illustrate the transition from a realistic to an idealistic point of view ; and for this reason he begins with a discussion of that argument. He accepts Kant's criticisms on the older form of the argument ; and they are, in fact, unanswerable. He points out, however, that acceptance of Kant's criticisms does not commit one to the epistemological principle that the only possible evidence for any existential proposition must be sense-given. This is obviously true. As regards that epistemological principle itself Professor Laird holds that it is not inconceivable that there might be some existential propositions for which there was evidence not given by the senses ; but I do not think he claims

to know of any instances of such propositions. I wonder how widely the term "sense-given" is to be interpreted in this epistemological principle? If it is taken literally and narrowly, the principle is plainly false, since the evidence for one's own past experiences depends on memory and introspection, and not on sensation. If it is taken so widely as to mean that the evidence for any *singular* existential proposition must include *acquaintance with particulars*, it has a good claim to be true and evident. I do not think that Professor Laird's hypothetical example of telepathy on page 44 would be a counter-instance to the principle when thus interpreted.

What Hegel called the "Ontological Argument" is, according to Professor Laird, not an argument at all, but an assertion which might be called "the Grand Ontological Assertion". The claim is that "what is really *given* to us is the infinitude of all being . . . and that this Absolute Whole . . . is thought-laden throughout" (p. 48). The upshot of Professor Laird's discussion is that, whilst it is not inconceivable that our datum might be of this kind, inspection does not show us that it is, and the arguments brought forward by idealists to prove that it must be are quite inconclusive. Moreover, the Whole which the G.O.A. asserts to be given to us would lack several characteristics which most theists would regard as part of the notion of God.

In the second lecture Professor Laird discusses "The Nature of Mind". His argument is rather rambling, and therefore difficult to summarise fairly; but, if I have not misunderstood him, the main points may be expressed as follows: The nature of a mind is most clearly revealed in the state of being awake and alert, and the most fundamental feature of this state is cognitive consciousness. But such consciousness or "awareness" includes two quite different, though intimately interconnected aspects or "dimensions", *viz.*, the reflexive and the transcendent. Compare, *e.g.*, the two experiences which would be expressed by the two sentences, "I am feeling a shooting pain" and "I am remembering a shooting pain". As regards the latter, it is quite sensible to suggest (a) that I might have had such a pain without now remembering it; (b) that I might now be having this ostensible memory-experience without having had such a pain; and (c) that, even if I did have such a pain as I am now remembering, there may have been features in it which I am not remembering at all, or am misremembering. Even if the memory is perfectly correct, it is evident that the experience of remembering now must be numerically other than the pain which was felt then. This is an instance of transcendent cognition. Now none of these suggestions can sensibly be made when a person says "I am feeling a shooting pain". It is not sensible to suggest that he might be having a pain without feeling it, or feeling it without having it, or that it might really be dull and throbbing though he feels it to be shooting. Nor is it in the least plausible to suggest that there are here two contemporary particulars, *viz.*, an experience

of feeling and a pain felt. The sense in which a person is aware of a pain in feeling it is non-transcendent awareness.

Now I understand Professor Laird to hold that whenever a person has a transcendently cognitive experience, *e.g.*, a memory or a perception or a process of thinking, he is *ipso facto* aware of that experience in the non-transcendent way in which he is aware of a pain in feeling it. Professor Laird does not accept the arguments which have been used to show that there cannot be *transcendent* reflexive awareness of contemporary experiences, and he thinks that in point of fact there is such awareness. But he points out that, even if the arguments were valid, they would not show that there can be no reflexive awareness of contemporary experiences; and he holds that reflexive awareness of the transcendent kind depends upon that of the non-transcendent kind.

The third lecture is entitled "The Implications of Idealism", but a considerable proportion of it is occupied with classifying the various kinds of idealism and summarily refuting either them or the main arguments for them. Professor Laird distinguishes epistemological and ontological idealism. He sub-divides the former into "pan-idea-ism" and "pan-ideatism"; and he identifies the latter with panpsychism. This does not seem to me to be a very happy division. Surely idealism of every kind is ontological and panpsychic, and what is here called "epistemological" idealism is simply those systems of ontological idealism which are founded wholly or mainly on epistemological arguments. An odd result of this classification is that Berkeley, whose arguments are largely epistemological, and Leibniz, whose arguments are almost wholly logical and ontological, are both counted as ontological idealists. Pan-ideatism is the theory of which the extreme and perhaps the only consistent form is the doctrine of an unknowable thing-in-itself. It is the theory that everything which anyone cognises is coloured and distorted to an unknown extent by being cognised. Pan-idea-ism is the theory that there is nothing but ideas. I take it that this is meant to include the denial of minds as well as of matter. Professor Laird does not mention any philosopher as an upholder of this theory, and I am not at all clear about what he has in mind in his references to it.

Professor Laird's conclusions about the implications of idealism may be summarised as follows: No form of idealism which was compatible with known empirical facts would justify a more cheerful view of man's nature and prospects than would be justified by a non-mentalistic interpretation of the same empirical facts.

In the fourth lecture, on "Omniscience", Professor Laird discusses two questions, *viz.* (i) whether there are reasons why there must be a being who knows everything, and (ii) whether such a being is possible at all. He says that the arguments for an omniscient being attempt to show that no one could know anything unless someone knew everything. He distinguishes two arguments, that from

"Sovereign Essences", which he associates with Plato or some of his followers, and that from "Eternal Truths", which occurs in Leibniz's writings. There is much learned historical discussion before Professor Laird finally dismisses these two arguments. My own feeling is that his difficulty here is not so much to knock down the arguments as to make them go through the motions of standing up to be shot at. If the arguments have been fairly presented (and I have no doubt that Professor Laird has done his best for them), it seems doubtful whether he is shooting at even sitting birds or only at a couple of stuffed owls.

The second question divides into two. Could there be a person who knows at each moment (a) all that is and has been known by anyone up to that moment, or (b) all that ever could be known? In each case we have further to consider in turn (α) transcendent, and (β) non-transcendent knowledge. Professor Laird's conclusions about (a) are as follows: It is not inconceivable that one person should know transcendentally all that is or has been known transcendentally by anyone up to a given date. It is unintelligible to suggest that anything which is known non-transcendentally by A could also be known non-transcendentally by anyone but A. (e.g., that B should feel literally and numerically the same feeling which is being felt by A). Therefore, if there be any particulars which can be known *only* non-transcendentally, it is impossible that any one person should know all such particulars as have been known up to a given date. Lastly, it seems almost certain that there *are* particulars (e.g., feelings) which can be known only non-transcendentally, though there are differences of opinion about the range of such particulars. Professor Laird, e.g., would not include *sensa* or images or bodily feelings among them, whilst many other philosophers would do so.

Since the narrower possibility envisaged in question (a) has been denied, the wider one which was mooted in question (b) can be rejected without special discussion. Professor Laird, in fact, devotes the rest of the lecture to discussing certain limitations on all possible knowledge and certain peculiarities which have been ascribed to divine knowledge. He points out that certain limitations which Locke ascribed to specifically human knowledge would probably affect all conceivable knowledge. If there are "brute facts", they will be "brute" for every knower who does not deceive himself about them. He also remarks that, with his own view of time, it is literally impossible that there should be non-inferential knowledge of the future comparable to memory-knowledge of the past; and that this is quite independent of the question of determinism in the causal sense. I think that this is a correct inference from the theory, but it suggests two comments to me: (1) If statements about the future are at present neither true nor false, is there not some difficulty about even inferential knowledge or probable opinion concerning future events? (2) The evidence for the occurrence of

apparently non-inferential knowledge of future events is already fairly strong, and is accumulating fairly rapidly in the experimental work of Mr. Soal, Mr. Whately Carington, and Dr. Rhine and his pupils, to go no further. I should feel rather uncomfortable in holding a theory of time which ruled out the possibility of such knowledge *in limine*.

Professor Laird deals with the ascription of *Personality* to God in his fifth lecture. He first considers what "personality" means and implies in men. It is a property of an embodied mind ; it is acquired in the course of interacting with a social environment ; and an important element in it is that of legal and moral responsibility. He next considers whether these three factors in human personality make it an inappropriate concept to apply to God. This may be denied either by contending that none of these three features is essential to the concept of personality or by contending that there is nothing in the concept of God to prevent his having a body of some kind and interacting in some way with a social environment and being in some sense morally responsible. By a judicious combination of these two methods Professor Laird tries to show that it is not necessarily absurd, though it must always be highly Pickwickian, to call God a "person".

The next topic discussed is whether it is possible to combine the propositions that God is the whole universe and that he is a person, in view of the fact that this would involve the consequence that one person contains all other persons as parts. Professor Laird considers in turn empirical analogies and metaphysical arguments. He holds that the facts of multiple personality and the unity of individuals in social groups lend no support to the view that several selves can be parts of a single self. The utmost that the former would suggest is that a single organism may sometimes be animated by more than one self ; and the utmost that the latter would suggest is that a community of persons may be a spiritual substance (though not a person) of a highly valuable kind. The metaphysical discussion consists mainly of a statement and criticism of McTaggart's doctrine that it is evidently impossible for two selves to have any part in common. In this connexion Professor Laird points out that for McTaggart all self-knowledge is transcendent, whilst, on his own view, such knowledge is primarily non-transcendent. He throws out, though with no great confidence, the suggestion that a whole which had non-transcendent awareness of itself might contain parts which were non-transcendently aware of themselves.

The rest of the lecture is concerned with the following question : Is it not an essential part of theism that the world is ordered with wisdom, justice, and benevolence ? Can any meaning be attached to such statements, and, if it could, would there be any reason to accept them, unless the world is governed by a wise, just, and benevolent person ? The essential points of Professor Laird's answer to this and all similar questions may be put as follows : Provided that inanimate, animate, and mental nature are, in fact,

so constituted and inter-related that their laws and collocations produce the kind of results which a wise, just, and benevolent person would approve, it is a matter of indifference whether these results are due to the existence and action of such a person or not. And there is no conclusive reason why any kind of good results which might be produced by the deliberate action of a cosmic Person should not equally arise, in the absence of such a person, from the laws and collocations of the material and spiritual universe.

This topic is pursued further in the sixth lecture, on "Providence". The lengthy discussion of physical and moral evil, with which the lecture begins, leads to the tame but judicious conclusion that the world contains much good and much evil and not a sufficient balance of either over the other to compel us to accept or to reject a belief in Divine Providence.

Professor Laird points out that the theory of Providence is a specification of the theory of God as a designer, *viz.*, that he is a being who orders the course of nature wisely for good ends. Of course he has long ago argued that there is no valid reason for accepting a God who is in any sense a designer. He now argues that it is difficult to combine the theory of a designer with the notion that God is perfect, in the double sense of morally excellent and ontologically all-embracing, though there might not be the same difficulty if the former feature were kept and the latter were dropped.

The next two lectures are concerned with Value in connexion with theism. The first is entitled "Value and Existence". Professor Laird starts by considering the slogan "There can be no divorce between value and existence" and trying to see whether there is any sense in which it is neither trivial nor obviously false. He points out (i) that the notion of having value sometimes means having positive as opposed to negative value, and sometimes means being either valuable or disvaluable; (ii) that in neither of these senses is it logically entailed by the notion of existing; and (iii) that we must distinguish between "maintenance-values", such as the power of an organism to adapt itself, to repair itself, and to reproduce its species, and "axiological values" such as truth, beauty, and moral goodness. Now the slogan would be of interest only if it meant or implied that everything has positive axiological value; and in this sense it cannot be true, since only rational beings and certain of their actions and experiences can have axiological value or disvalue. It is charitable to suppose that there is something behind the verbiage of a slogan which has been repeated with such enthusiasm by so many great and good men; but I have never been able to discover what it can be, and Professor Laird has been no more fortunate. It will be worth while to quote an excellent comment from page 227 on Lotze's dictum that what should be is the ground of what is: "We attribute to all existence the sort of effect that some existent (*e.g.*, the thought of value) can excite in some other existent (*e.g.*, a man), and so profess to speak about a

reason for existence itself. A little brief reflection . . . should be sufficient to dispel all such dreams."

The second of these two lectures, which is the eighth in the course, is entitled "The Moral Proofs of Theism". It begins with a brief refutation of the ridiculous argument that the existence of moral "laws" involves the existence of a supernatural law-giver. The rest of the lecture is occupied with an elaborate critical discussion of Kant's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason and noumenal freedom. Professor Laird seems to me to draw the right distinctions and to make the right criticisms; but there is little which is both new and true to be said on the subject.

There is a discussion on Human Immortality in the Appendix to Lecture VIII. I think that the most important part of it is fairly summarised in the last paragraph but one (p. 265): "I . . . agree that individual human immortality would provide a much more plausible basis for the indestructibility of the values (or disvalues) humanly achieved than, so far as I can see, any alternative theory. But it is not true that there could be no conservation of human values if a human soul never survived the death of its body."

Lecture IX, on "Pantheism", opens with two general remarks with which I heartily agree. ". . . So many Western theologians and so many Western philosophers have been very unfair to pantheism" (p. 266). Yet ". . . it is plain that many theologians and a great many Christian theologians are pantheists".

Professor Laird divides pantheism into (i) distributive, and (ii) totalitarian. The former holds that every part of the universe is either (a) wholly, or (b) partly, divine. Alternative (b) is called "mitigated" distributive pantheism. I think that it would probably be better to state distributive pantheism in terms of McTaggart's notion of a "set of parts", and to say that it holds that the universe has a set of parts, each of which is either wholly or partly divine. Professor Laird's discussion has practically reduced it to this by the middle of page 274, and it is doubtful whether the theory is worth consideration if taken more widely. It seems fairly plain that nothing below the level of human persons could be called "divine" in any non-trivial sense. Therefore the problem of distributive pantheism resolves itself into the two following: (1) Are human beings divine? (2) Is there any reason to believe that the universe has a set of parts consisting of nothing but human beings and other persons at least as highly organised as they? Professor Laird discusses, but does not profess to answer, these questions.

Totalitarian pantheism (which does not necessarily exclude pantheism of the distributive kind) is the doctrine that all that exists forms a highly integrated unity, and that this whole is divine. It need not be (and, in view of what Professor Laird has argued before, barely could be) a self. But a whole might be very highly integrated and have great intrinsic value without being a self. This is true; but could it have much intrinsic value unless it were *either*

a person or a society of intimately inter-related persons? If this is an essential condition, we are back at the second question which was raised and left unanswered in connexion with distributive pantheism. Professor Laird thinks that it would be difficult to hold that such a whole could be perfectly good in view of the badness of some of its parts; but he does not think that this kind of pantheism would be incompatible with some of its parts possessing moral freedom in any sense in which it is at all plausible to suppose that men do, in fact, possess it.

Professor Laird next discusses a theory which he calls "monarchical pantheism". He says that many theologians use language which implies (a) that God simply is the totality of all that exists, taken as a collective whole, and (b) that he also is the supreme governor of that whole. He tries to do what he can for this doctrine by means of a distinction between "dissociable" and "participating" parts; but he finally concludes that this distinction will not help, and that the doctrine is nonsensical, because it would require the Whole to be one of its own parts. I do not myself see why it need involve such nonsense as this. Why should it not be interpreted to mean that the Whole, taken as a collective unity, is divine and stands in a relation of pre-eminence over each of its parts severally and over every collection of them?

The last lecture, called "Concluding Reflections", falls into three parts. The first is a synopsis of the argument in the Second Series; the second discusses the connexion between this and the First Series; and the third contains some general reflexions on the whole subject.

The following seem to be the most important points: (1) If the purely cosmological considerations of the First Series suggest the existence of God at all, what they suggest is that the universe is a system having certain properties which would justify us in calling it "divine". There is nothing here to encourage the belief in a divine person or group of persons to whom the rest of the world owes its "deiformity". Now many philosophers would say that, when axiological facts are taken into consideration, the scene changes and the form of theism which was the more probable of the two now becomes less probable than the doctrine of a transcendent divine person or group of persons. It is obvious that Professor Laird does not accept this view; or at any rate that he considers the *prima facie* difficulties of transcendent theism to be so much greater than those of immanent theism that he is very anxious to show that the axiological facts are consistent with the latter.

(2) If we ask whether Professor Laird thinks that the known empirical facts favour theism, even of the impersonal and immanent kind, we seem to meet with a different answer in the second and in the third section of these "Concluding Reflections". On page 304 he writes: "Empirically I cannot find high spiritual properties except in human minds or in societies of human minds. Human

minds do not seem to me to constitute a large part of the world, or to be the strongest part of the world. Such appearances, no doubt, may be very deceptive ; but they *are* the appearances. . . .” But on page 319 he writes : “ . . . I did not appreciate the force of theism when I began this enquiry. . . . While I do not think that any theistic argument is conclusive, and am of opinion that very few theistic proofs establish a high degree of probability, I also incline to the belief that theistic metaphysics is stronger than most, and that metaphysics is not at all weak in principle despite the strain that it puts upon the human intellect.” I must confess that I can find nothing in either Series to justify the favourable estimate of theism in particular or metaphysics in general expressed in the latter sentence. It seems to me that the first sentence quoted is in accordance with the facts and with the findings of these lectures. The impression which I get from the two Series is that, unless Theism can derive support from the facts of specifically religious and mystical experience which Professor Laird has deliberately excluded from his purview, there is nothing to entitle it to serious consideration.

C. D. BROAD:

An Introduction to Hegel. By G. R. G. MURE. Oxford : at the Clarendon Press, 1940. Pp. xx + 180. 10s. 6d.

THIS is a difficult book to review. It purports to be an “introduction to Hegel for non-professional readers. “For the professional student,” the author promises “to offer a book on Hegel’s logic in close connexion with the present work”. The present work thus presupposes no acquaintance with Hegel ; “the business of an Introduction is to introduce,” and to introduce is “to whet the appetite” for acquaintance and not “to provide a substitute” for it (p. xix). This task the author seeks to accomplish by expounding Hegel, not against the background of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries, but rather against that of Greek philosophy. His main intention is “to contrast Hegel’s general philosophical position with Aristotle’s as if Hegel had reached his own view simply through the effort to solve the problem as Aristotle left it” (p. 52). But the author is not content with a mere exposition of Hegel’s philosophy ; his ultimate purpose is to vindicate it against criticism. “The book may be found to possess some unity if it is read as a gradual approach to Hegel’s conception of truth” (p. xix), and this conception, in the polemical context in which the author develops it, emerges as the only tenable one. This special treatment of Hegel’s philosophy is *eo ipso* a case of special pleading.

The book has thus a three-fold aim—to make Hegel intelligible to the elementary student ; to interpret Hegel in relation to Greek thought ; and to exhibit Hegel (to echo the words of one of his early disciples) as *der unwiderlegte Weltphilosoph*. Truly an ambitious programme for a slender volume !